

Message Text

SECRET

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 12295

EXDIS

PASS TO DOE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: USSR PLENARY STATEMENT,
AUGUST 10, 1978

CTB MESSAGE NO. 293

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT DELIVERED AT PLENARY
AUG 10 BY HEAD OF USSR DELEGATION. BEGIN TEXT:

WE HAVE LISTENED WITH GREAT INTEREST TO THE REPORTS
DELIVERED BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE THREE GROUPS ON
THE WORK BEING DONE IN THE RESPECTIVE GROUPS.

THESE REPORTS SHOW THAT DURING THE PERIOD SINCE THE LAST
PLENARY MEETING, A GREAT DEAL OF WORK HAS INDEED BEEN DONE
IN THE GROUPS. ONE CAN STATE WITH SATISFACTION THAT A
CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF WORK HAS BEEN DONE ON REACHING
AGREEMENT ON THE LANGUAGE OF THE TREATY AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
WHICH WE HAVE STILL TO AGREE UPON IN THE COURSE OF OUR
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NEGOTIATIONS.

I THINK ALL OF US AGREE THAT QUITE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS
IN WORKING OUT THE TEXT OF THE TREATY HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED
IN THE POLITICAL-LEGAL WORKING GROUP. IN ESSENCE, THE
OPERATIVE ARTICLES OF THE TREATY HAVE BEEN AGREED UPON,
WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS.

WE ATTRIBUTE PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT ARTICLE I OF THE TREATY HAS BEEN FORMULATED; IT PROVIDES FOR A BAN ON ANY NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST EXPLOSIONS IN ANY LOCATION AND IN ANY ENVIRONMENT. THIS IS THE FUNDAMENTAL CORNERSTONE ON WHICH THE EDIFICE OF THE TREATY UNDER NEGOTIATION RESTS. THERE IS NO AND THERE CAN BE NO OTHER SOLUTION OF THIS CARDINAL TREATY ISSUE.

WORK IN THE OTHER TWO GROUPS IS GOING ON NO LESS INTENSIVELY, ALTHOUGH IT IS TRUE THAT THEY HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO PRESENT US WITH SPECIFIC TEXTS. THIS, HOWEVER, DOES NOT IN ANY WAY DETRACT FROM THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EFFORTS MADE BY THE PARTICIPANTS OF THESE GROUPS TOWARD RESOLVING THE REMAINING OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

I SUPPOSE IT WOULD HARDLY BE ADVISABLE TO GO INTO A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE WORKING GROUPS IN THEIR CONSIDERATION OF THE REMAINING ISSUES, THE MORE SO SINCE WE HAVE JUST HEARD SUBSTANTIVE REPORTS FROM THEIR REPRESENTATIVES. PERHAPS IN THE INTEREST OF SPEEDING UP OUR FURTHER MOVEMENT FORWARD AND THE EARLIEST COMPLETION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, IT WOULD BE MORE CORRECT AT THIS TIME TO TOUCH ON THE BASIC ISSUES WHICH ARE SLOWING DOWN THE REACHING OF AGREEMENT ON THE PROBLEM OF A COMPLETE BAN OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS.

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FIRST I SHALL ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF TREATY DURATION. IN RESPONSE TO THE US AND UK PROPOSAL FOR A FIVE-YEAR DURATION, WE HAVE STATED THAT WE ARE PREPARED, IN PRINCIPLE, TO TAKE A POSITIVE ATTITUDE TO THIS PROPOSAL, PROVIDING THAT OUR PARTNERS WILL TAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION WITH A VIEW TO FINDING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS TO OTHER YET UNAGREED ISSUES, IN PARTICULAR VERIFICATION ISSUES. AT THE SAME TIME WE HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT THE ISSUE OF DURATION AND THE ALSO IMPORTANT RELATED ISSUE OF THE DESTINY OF THE BAN ON NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS HAVE AN EXTREMELY GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE SOLUTION OF MANY OTHER TREATY ISSUES.

WE HAVE ALSO STATED THAT WE CANNOT AGREE TO THE PROPOSAL THAT THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THIS TREATY SHOULD BE REPLACED BY ANOTHER TREATY BE DISCUSSED AT THE PROPOSED TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE. BASED ON THE POSITION OF PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION ON THIS PROBLEM, WE EMPHASIZED THAT WE CONSIDER IT MOST IMPORTANT THAT DURING DISCUSSION OF OPERATION OF THE TREATY BY THE CONFERENCE, THE POSSIBILITY OF EXTENDING THE TREATY BE PROVIDED FOR,

DEPENDING ON WHETHER ANY STATES NOT PARTY TO THE TREATY
WOULD BE CONDUCTING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS.

WE ARE OBLIGED TO STATE THAT UP TILL NOW, THE US SIDE
HAS NOT PROVIDED AN ANSWER TO THESE QUESTIONS OF FUNDA-
MENTAL IMPORTANCE, WHICH DOES NOT FACILITATE FURTHER
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES
IT NECESSARY TO EMPHASIZE THE EXTREMELY GREAT IMPORTANCE
OF THE EARLIEST SOLUTION OF THESE QUESTIONS, ON WHICH THE
SOVIET UNION HAS DEFINED ITS POSITION CLEARLY.

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NOW ON THE SUBJECT OF THE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF
DESIGNATED PERSONNEL. HERE, TOO, CERTAIN WORK HAS BEEN
DONE. IN SEARCHING FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT
ON THIS ISSUE, THE SOVIET DELEGATION PROPOSED APPROPRIATE
COMPROMISE LANGUAGE SEVERAL DAYS AGO. THIS LANGUAGE IS
BASED ON AN APPROACH TO WHICH WE ATTACH EXTREMELY GREAT
IMPORTANCE, NAMELY THAT THE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF
INSPECTION PERSONNEL SHOULD BE FORMULATED IN A GENERAL
WAY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE GREAT VARIETY OF SITUATIONS
WHICH CAN OCCUR IN THE COURSE OF AN ON-SITE INSPECTION.
AT THE SAME TIME THIS LANGUAGE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT, TO
THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE FOR US, THE WISHES OF OUR
NEGOTIATING PARTNERS THAT RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS BE
RECORDED SUFFICIENTLY DEFINITELY SO AS TO PRECLUDE THE
POSSIBILITY OF ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS ARISING IN THE COURSE
OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON AN INSPECTION AT THE SITE OF

AN AMBIGUOUS EVENT.

OUR TASK IS TO DEVELOP A POLITICAL DOCUMENT, TO FORMULATE THE BASIC PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS OF VERIFICATION
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OF TREATY COMPLIANCE. WE MUST FORMULATE THE BASIC RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE DESIGNATED PERSONNEL WHO CARRY OUT AN ON-SITE INSPECTION; PRECISELY THE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS AND NOT THE TECHNOLOGY OF THE INSPECTION, NOT TECHNICAL INSTRUCTIONS ON THE USE OF THIS OR THAT EQUIPMENT.

WE WOULD LIKE TO HOPE, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT AS YET RECEIVED ANY GROUNDS FOR SUCH HOPES, THAT OUR PARTNERS WILL DEMONSTRATE READINESS TO PROMPTLY COMPLETE AGREEMENT OF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TEXT ON THE BASIS OF OUR COMPROMISE LANGUAGE.

I TURN NOW TO ANOTHER IMPORTANT QUESTION, THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS. ALTHOUGH, AS WE HAVE NOTED MANY TIMES, WE DO NOT SEE THE NEED FOR ANY SPECIAL FORMS OF VERIFICATION IN ADDITION TO THOSE ON WHICH AGREEMENT HAS ALREADY BEEN REACHED, WE HAVE EXPRESSED OUR READINESS TO CONSIDER THE PROPOSAL ON NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS AS WELL. MOREOVER, NOT SO LONG AGO WE PROPOSED SPECIFIC LANGUAGE ON THIS SUBJECT, ONCE AGAIN IN THE INTEREST OF REACHING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT ON THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION OF TREATY COMPLIANCE AS A WHOLE. ON THE ONE HAND THIS LANGUAGE IS BASED ON THE EXISTING STATE OF AFFAIRS AS REGARDS NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, WHICH AS OF TODAY (AND NO ONE CAN DISPUTE THIS) ARE FULLY SATISFACTORY TO ALL PARTICIPANTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND ON THE OTHER HAND ON THE REALISTICALLY AVAILABLE POSSIBILITIES IN THIS FIELD. BUT WE ARE PREPARED TO GO FURTHER AND TO PROVIDE FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF SEISMIC VERIFICATION MEANS AND TO RECORD THIS IN THE AGREEMENT IN AN APPROPRIATE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE FORM.

HOWEVER, GENTLEMEN, IT IS NECESSARY FOR ALL TO HAVE A
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CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE FURTHER STAGE-BY-STAGE DEVELOPMENT OF SEISMIC VERIFICATION MEANS CANNOT BE BASED ON SOME SINGLE SPECIFIC SCHEME WHICH, AT THAT, DOES NOT EVEN EXIST YET. AND IF SOMEONE STILL HARBORS ILLUSIONS THAT THE IMPROVED SEISMIC EQUIPMENT MUST OF NECESSITY

BEAR THE TRADEMARK OF SOME SPECIFIC LABORATORY, COMPANY,
OR EVEN OF SOME SPECIFIC COUNTRY, I AM CERTAIN THAT THIS
WOULD NOT BE PRODUCTIVE FOR THE SUCCESS OF OUR COMMON
CAUSE OR FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE GREAT INTERNATIONAL
TASK WHICH HAS BEEN ENTRUSTED TO US BY OUR GOVERNMENTS
AND WHICH IS OF ENORMOUS SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE WORLD
AT LARGE. I HOPE THAT THESE CONSIDERATIONS OF OURS,
STATED IN A SPIRIT OF REALISM AND COOPERATION,
WILL BE DULY APPRECIATED BY OUR NEGOTIATING PARTNERS.

AS WAS REPORTED TO US BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
POLITICAL-LEGAL WORKING GROUP TODAY, BUSINESSLIKE WORK ON
DRAFTING THE TEXT OF THE PNE PROTOCOL HAS BEGUN IN THAT
GROUP. WE HOPE THAT THE GROUP WILL SOON BE ABLE TO REACH
AGREEMENT ON THE TEXT OF SUCH A PROTOCOL. WITHOUT GOING
INTO A DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC LANGUAGE, I WOULD LIKE TO
EMPHASIZE ONLY ONE PROVISION WHICH IS OF CARDINAL
IMPORTANCE TO US: THIS PROTOCOL MUST BE BASED ON THE
PROPOSAL, TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE WESTERN DELE-
GATIONS REPRESENTED HERE HAVE AGREED, FOR ESTABLISHING A
MORATORIUM ON PNES. SHOULD THIS IMPORTANT PROVISION BE
INCORPORATED INTO THE TEXT OF THE PROTOCOL, THEN, IN OUR
OPINION, AGREEING UPON OTHER PROTOCOL LANGUAGE WOULD NOT
POSE INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES. THERE SHOULD BE NO
DELAYS IN THIS IMPORTANT WORK.
IN SUMMARY WE WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT ALTHOUGH THE GENE-
RAL STATE OF AFFAIRS OF VARIOUS QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN

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WORKING OUT THE TREATY IS NOT AT EQUAL STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT, ON THE WHOLE WE CAN NOTE WITHOUT EXAGGERATION THAT SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS LATELY, AND THAT IS WHY IT IS IMPORTANT, AS WE RECENTLY JOINTLY REPORTED TO THE CCD, TO FURTHER MAINTAIN THE PACE AND FORWARD MOVEMENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE URGE THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO DEMONSTRATE EVEN GREATER PERSISTENCE AND AN EVEN MORE CREATIVE APPROACH TO THE SEARCH FOR WAYS OF RESOLVING THE REMAINING QUESTIONS, CONSTANTLY KEEPING IN MIND THAT OUR TASK IS TO WORK OUT A DOCUMENT OF ENORMOUS POLITICAL IMPORTANCE. THESE ARE THE INSTRUCTIONS THAT WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ALL GROUPS WORKING ON DRAFTING APPROPRIATE SECTIONS OF THE TREATY. END TEXT. JOHNSON

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